

Popular Ecologies in Southern Europe: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Cases

Antonio Maria Pusceddu

My research on popular ecologies started with a basic question: why have two industrial cities, in Italy (Brindisi) and Portugal (Sines), developed, negotiated or adapted to different ways of living with industrial hazard, despite sharing many characteristics and similar historical trajectories shaped by the same planning tools of industrial development - the now forgotten “growth poles”? How can we account for the complex interactions of factors, scales and socio-ecological frameworks that can help us explain why one region developed a latent and often intense socio-environmental conflict while the other never did? In this paper, I set the main conceptual, methodological and historical coordinates for Wednesday's seminar, in which I will delve more deeply into the ethnography of popular ecologies.

The pre-paper is organized as follows: first, I introduce the subject of my research through ironic Marian devotions among chemical workers in southern Portugal. Second, I briefly discuss the general conceptual and methodological coordinates of the research - elaborating on “the popular”. The third and longest section provides the general background and context of my research.

1. Madonna-shaped plastic bottles and petrochemical devotions

During my childhood, a particularly religious and devout aunt used to bring back from her frequent pilgrimages to Lourdes, in the French Pyrenees (perhaps the earliest and most important Catholic pilgrimage site built around modern Marian apparitions), small plastic Madonna-shaped bottles filled with the holy (or perhaps just blessed) water from the well of the apparitions. White, opaque plastic bottles with a blue crown-shaped cap that I enjoyed drinking as a 6-year-old kid, more for the strange plastic taste it gave the water than for its supposed supernatural benefits. It is perhaps because of all these common

Madonna-shaped bottles and all their magic —oil-based polymers that transfigure popular and official religiosity into the great fetish of the commodity (or vice versa) — that I was amused, and intrigued when, last summer (no longer a child, no longer interested in drinking plastic-flavored water from Madonna-shaped bottles), while doing fieldwork in southern Portugal, I stumbled across a flyer advertising a popular festival dedicated to “Nossa Senhora das Petroquímicas” - the Madonna of the Petrochemical Industries.

Summer in Portugal is a time of popular festivals (*arraiais* - *arraial* in the singular), often (if not mostly) related to religious devotion. The festival promoted in Vila Nova de Santo André was clearly a lay festival, ironically and irreverently alluding to the many religious festivals dedicated to the Madonna, while still conveying a clear sense of the things that matter in the region. Vila Nova de Santo André is a “new town” (*vila nova*) built in the 1970s to house the workers of the Sines industrial complex (mainly oil refinery, petrochemical factories and the largest coal-fired power plant in the country), which today has 10 thousand inhabitants, still strongly linked to the oil industry, as jobs have often been passed down from generation to generation - especially direct, stable jobs - creating a self-proclaimed “aristocracy of labor.” Many others are employed in the logistics port (the largest employer in the region) operated by the Singapore-based multinational P.S.A. Not a few workers depend on precarious employment in the complex chains of subcontracting companies in the maintenance sector, while many newcomers (extra-European migrants) are employed in the construction works that are expanding the industrial area towards the “green” and digital economy (data centers, “green” hydrogen production plants, a factory for assembling li-ion batteries, etc.). The *arraial* was organized by the Sports and Cultural Group of Repsol Chemical Workers to raise money for the local firefighters and had among its sponsors the same oil company Repsol (a Spanish multinational).

The *arraial* of Nossa Senhora das Petroquímicas, while not a particularly important social event - more of a playful charity initiative - is a seemingly banal example (among many) of what I tend to think through the lens of popular ecology, that is, a framework that helps me bring together different conceptual strands that can account for how economy, environment, culture, and politics are intertwined in the production and reproduction of socio-ecological relations. I use the term popular ecology less as a clear and delimited object of inquiry (something that is out there, ready to be found) than as a heuristic tool that

helps me integrate a constellation of concepts that articulate the popular in different ways with the economic, environmental, cultural, and political spheres — from popular ecologies to popular culture, from popular environmentalism to environmental populism. As a perspective centered on the material conditions and lived experiences of social difference, it aims to contribute to a broader critical conversation about the need to rescale the understanding of socio-environmental change from the bottom up. Given how politically sensitive ecological issues have become (from climate crisis to ecological degradation, from “green” transition and economic restructuring to energy politics and the geopolitics of resource extraction), I argue for the importance of a more integrated approach to the tensions, contradictions, and aspirations that boil over in contemporary crises.

The research focuses on industrial regions that have become heavily dependent (for one reason or another) on oil and coal-based industries, a condition that makes them fruitful sites for exploring the changing geography of the oil economy and the immediate effects of epochal shifts in the broader global restructuring of production processes. Comparative research is constructed through the constant interplay of empirical observation and theoretical reflection, which are inseparable in the way general questions are examined through concrete configurations of people and places.

The raw materials of my research are the experiences and relationships of the people with whom I interact and the ways in which they account for them, resulting from long-term empirical observation and participation in and across different contexts - from the domestic to the public, though these two categories tend to collapse easily into one another. Qualitative research is, inevitably, complemented with quantitative data which are partly collected in site and partly drawn from official statistics —and the gap and mismatch between the two is often the source of important insights. However, both quantitative and qualitative research need to be complemented with the study of geography and history of the places and processes I investigate. To avoid the empiricist trap of anthropologists’ taste for ethnographic miniatures, it is also necessary to constantly pay attention to the complexity of scales that coexist and concur to shape the livelihood conditions and possibilities of social reproduction of concrete places and people (Katz 2001). Feminist geographer Doreen Massey’s idea of the “global sense of place” offers a crucial understanding of the density of scale, for which scales are not bounded and distinct but can all be in the

same place at the same time. The “places” should not be understood as “areas with boundaries” but, more productively, as “articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings” that are partly – if not largely – constructed “on a far larger scale” than that (allegedly “local”) of what we would assume to be “the place itself” (Massey 1994: 154–155).

Fieldwork in Brindisi began in 2015 and continued through 2016, for a total of 16 months that I lived in the city. In Sines, I have been conducting fieldwork on and off since 2023, and only in 2024 was I able to spend five full months on site. Contrary to Brindisi, the proximity of Sines (1h30 by car) allows me to participate in different activities or to spend weekends or a few days whenever possible, making the fieldwork more regular than in Brindisi (where the fieldwork was intensely concentrated in a few years and postponed since the pandemic). Also, I had decided not to do more extensive research in Brindisi before doing substantial research in Sines (which I eventually did). In fact, since I approached Sines with research insights developed in Brindisi in mind, I find it useful to move in the opposite direction, revisiting Brindisi after the research insights developed in Sines.

Fieldwork is complemented by archival research, particularly relevant in the case of Sines, where I had easy access to all the materials related to the conflicts of the post-revolutionary period in the well-organized Sines Municipal Archives¹. Research in Sines has also been prepared, between 2021 and 2022, with archival research on the Sines project at the National Library in Lisbon.

3. Who said popular?

The phrase “popular ecologies” is one of a long list of N-words (with some combinations more successful than others, such as “popular culture” or “popular art”) to which the adjective “popular” is supposed to add some meaning (the hint of a difference, whatever that may be, from words without adjectives), while

¹ Research in the Brindisi Municipal Archives was limited to the transcription of the debate in the municipal assembly, between 1956 and 1964. Further archival research, yet limited for reasons beyond my control, was carried out in the Municipal Archives of a nearby town (Mesagne), where a former petrochemical employee and union delegate had donated all his vast and heterogeneous collection of documents related to the petrochemical complex, from 1963 to 1992 (year of his retiring). I developed some reflections on this solitary effort to preserve the memory of industrial labor and struggles in (Pusceddu 2022).

at the same time conveying the implicit idea of something *less*. The elusive nature of the popular makes it a problematic analytical concept, for it is either too vague or ambiguous, if not too rhetorical. As a result, attempts to make a conceptually controlled use of the term inevitably tend to erase some meanings and privilege others (e.g. conflating popular with class²). Raymond Williams (2014: 180) points out two essential meanings of the popular, with a significantly different historical depth. One is the old and enduring meaning of “low” or “base”, with a clearly derogatory use, while the other is the “prominent modern meaning of widely favoured and well-liked”. Departing from Williams’ philological reconstruction, I suggest taking these two meanings as constitutive of the popular as something inherently contradictory and ambiguous.

In political ecology, the popular has a markedly political connotation. On the one hand, this has allowed “varieties of environmentalism” to be made visible through the prism of difference (Guha & Martinez-Alier 2010; Martinez-Alier 2002). On the other hand, however, unproblematic uses such as “popular environmentalism,” while fulfilling a politically charged distinction from mainstream environmentalism, tend to overemphasize autonomy and horizontality and fail to acknowledge the more complex field of ideological formations — and vertical relations — that are often integral to popular environmentalisms.³ Similarly, attempts to theorize popular ecologies (e.g. Filipo 2021) along the lines of so-called “environmentalism of the poor” (Martinez-Alier 2002) fail to move beyond the equation of the popular with class, which, as Stuart Hall (1981) acutely observed, are “deeply interrelated but not interchangeable”. Slightly different uses of the popular, at least in relation to the complex interactions between hegemonic worldviews, political economy, and the material conditions of social reproduction, emerge from debates on popular economies (largely but not exclusively in Latin America), which have paid more attention to the circulation, creative reinvention, enactment (and even subversion) of neoliberal

² Others, such as Brown (1987), developed the concept of “popular epidemiology” (which is relevant to my research), using popular in the sense of *lay* to characterize an experience-based social knowledge that is distinct from scientific discourse (epidemiology without the adjective).

³ This is not to deny the relevance of organized forms of grassroots environmentalism, such as in the labor movement (Barca 2012).

formations in the concrete practices of making a living (Collectif Rosa Bonheur 2019; Gago 2017; Dürr & Müller 2019; Hull & James 2012; Narotzky 2020).⁴ At the same time, the emphasis on the autonomy and antagonism of the popular tends to reproduce flawed readings that indulge in ill-concealed political voluntarism (e.g. Gago 2018). Recent work on environmental populism, on the other hand, seems more attentive to the dynamic contradictions that punctuate the circulation of populist politics (e.g. Bosworth 2022), without necessarily reproducing the flattening schematism of populist discourses themselves, between the people and the elite (on populism, I tend to follow Chatterjee 2019).

My research engages with the debates and literature I have briefly summarized by revisiting Antonio Gramsci's theorization of the *nazionale-popolare* and mobilizing the concept of *senso comune* as a crucial category for thinking about popular ecologies as a generative framework to explore the intersection of the material conditions and socioecological relations of concrete populations with broader and diverse (often dominant) ideological fields and structural processes. I revisit Gramsci in the good company of Stuart Hall (1988), whose analysis of Thatcherism (and, more generally, some insightful uses of the popular among the British New Left - see Forgacs 2008) provided an inspiring starting point for thinking through *senso comune* in the context of authoritarian populism. The ambivalences and contradictions of *senso comune* need to be understood in their practical implications, not just as representations or ways of thinking, but as implicit material forces open to potentially different political projects (see also Crehan 2016).

Starting from the Russian populist debates, Gramsci reflected on the relevance of the popular in the construction of national and international hegemony. In doing so, he pursued an in-depth analysis of hegemony in Western societies, pointing to the popular as a crucial terrain for the formation of a “collective will”, thus developing an acute understanding of the constant tension between class inequalities (the popular as “low” or “base”) and unifying ideological discourses (the popular as “widely

⁴ Debates on popular economies frequently overlaps or intersects with wider debates on informal economy and are strongly influenced by the feminist critique of political economy in defining a perspective on production and reproduction that encompasses the totality of income-generating and life-sustaining activities, within a wider concern for the multiple scales and temporal dimensions of social reproduction (daily and intergenerational).

favoured and well-liked”), and the persistent and latent contradictions that such tension generates in capitalist societies. Following Gramsci's conceptualization, the ambivalences and contradictions of the popular, rather than merely limiting an ambiguous term, make it a productive and dynamic concept for grasping the intricacies of socio-ecological positionalities. In the remaining part of the paper, I outline the general background where to situate the emergence of the concrete popular ecologies I am examining.

4. Once a development pole, always a development pole?

The recent history of Brindisi and Sines has been significantly marked by the state-sponsored creation of large industrial development poles in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. Industrial planning followed similar paths, privileging capital-intensive oil-based industries, large energy infrastructures (coal-fired power plants), and the development of auxiliary mechanical and manufacturing industries. A significant difference was the different maritime projection; Sines was open to the Atlantic trade routes (a reason why it was chosen for the construction of an oceanic deepwater port), while Brindisi was limited to the trans-Adriatic and Mediterranean routes, in general the oil route through the Suez Canal.

Brindisi is a city of 81 thousand inhabitants on the low Adriatic coast, home to various industrial activities ranging from aeronautics to pharmaceuticals, with a prominent presence of petrochemical production and energy infrastructures. The latter, however, are undergoing important and accelerated changes with the decommissioning of the main power plant (scheduled for the end of 2025) and the decline of the petrochemical sector. LyondellBasell is closing a plant in 2023. Earlier this year, the multinational Eni announced the closure of the steam cracker (one of the two existing in Italy, the other in Sicily) and the gradual closure of the complex, while *promising* an unspecified investment in the construction of a *gigafactory*. While the closure of such industries is a recurring demand of environmental groups, the end of a six-decade chemical industry and the lack of a real alternative inevitably raises concerns about what comes next.

Sines, Vasco de Gama's hometown, is a smaller town (elevated to the status of "city" in 1998, in the Portuguese administrative system) with 14 thousand inhabitants and a fluctuating number of workers employed in the maintenance and (more recently) construction sectors. Sines is part of a larger urban

triangle that includes the hilly town of Santiago do Cacém and the aforementioned Vila Nova de Santo André. The Sines project originally envisioned a new city for 100,000 inhabitants, which would also accommodate the population displaced from Sines and its rural surroundings, while the old town would become a service center for a major port hub. In the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution (1974), the people of Sines waged an intense struggle against the project and managed to make small modifications to the urban destination. As a result, the city expanded along the industrial infrastructures, such as the oil terminal, pipelines and tanks serving the refinery and petrochemical complex. In total, the urban triangle (which includes a continuum of rural settlements scattered in the surroundings) counts about 45 thousand inhabitants. Unlike Brindisi, which presents unemployment rates chronically higher than the national average (13% and 8.2% respectively in 2022), Sines reflect the national average (8.1% and 8.2% respectively in 2021), while presenting higher wages than the national average (about 40% higher). Brindisi, on the other hand, performs poorly in national statistics — as experts like to say. Official statistics don't tell the whole story, of course, but they help to give a picture of the different positions these two areas have today in the respective national economies: relatively peripheral in the case of Brindisi and quite central in the case of Sines.

Since the early 2020s, Sines has seen a rapid increase in industrial investment, with the expansion of existing plants (petrochemical complex and oil refinery), the construction of new ones (a Chinese-funded factory for the production of lithium-ion batteries, a plant for the production of green hydrogen and ammonia, a data center, etc.), and the renovation of the decommissioned power plant (in 2021) for the production of green hydrogen. In addition, a new terminal will soon be built alongside the expansion of the existing logistics terminal (currently the main employer in the region). All these investments, concentrated in a few years and expected to be realized by 2030, have polarized a new flow of workers, mostly migrants, creating significant concerns about the lack of housing conditions. While the people of Brindisi are worried about the decrease in job opportunities, which will aggravate the already high unemployment rate and trigger new emigration, the area of Sines could experience a rapid demographic expansion due to the increase in job opportunities. These recent developments, however, are somewhat consistent with a longer history of chronic surplus labor in Brindisi, which has created the conditions for

a flourishing informal economy, and the regular labor shortages in Sines and the periodic growth of its temporary population. What is new is the demography of both areas, with a steady decline and aging of the population in Brindisi (which in the long run may significantly reduce the formation of surplus labor) and a steady influx of young new residents in the Sines area, which contrasts with the decline and aging of the national population. In the short term, and if all the projects are realized, this could significantly expand and change the demographic profile of the region due to the unprecedented influx of migrant workers.

While the main timeframe I consider for my research is limited to the last fifty years (from the 1970s, taking the oil shocks as a reference point), it is useful to offer a longer historical picture of the main developments that in one way or another, and in both contexts, preceded or anticipated later industrialization. Such a longer historical perspective can help place the two cities in a broader global historical framework and thus chart the gradual integration of both places and people into the global circuits of accumulation of modern industrial capitalism. At the same time, addressing a longer historical process can be a good antidote to the messianic narrative of modernization, which in both cases tends to present later industrialization as the ground zero of a new era and an existential break with the immobility of the past.

In Brindisi, national and international infrastructural developments created the conditions for early industrialization already at the end of the 19th century. The improvement of the port infrastructure, the construction of a more functional road network and the Adriatic railway (1864), soon after the Italian political unification, created the conditions for the integration of the city into wider trade routes. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the British Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company transferred the maritime connection between London and Bombay from Marseilles to Brindisi (from 1870 to 1912). The appearance of mechanical workshops and shipyards for the maintenance of the ships and the creation of a seaplane base (which operated the first Italian international air connection, Brindisi-Athens-Istanbul) laid the foundations for the development of the aeronautical industry in the 1930s, under the auspices of the Fascist regime. Mechanical factories and workshops expanded rapidly as auxiliaries to the military industry, which faced deep crises in both postwar periods. Most of these proto-industrial

attempts were wiped out as international conditions changed, revealing the city's vulnerability to external pressures and wartime events. The promising emergence of the petrochemical industry in the early 1960s revealed similar weaknesses. Unlike its predecessors, however, the oil industry would have left a much more lasting and complicated legacy.

At the turn of the 19th century, Sines was little more than a small fishing village with a growing cork and canning industry, mostly controlled by foreign (German, French and British) investors. The cork industry, which attracted a considerable workforce from the rural areas of Alentejo, had its heyday for a few decades, with a combative labor movement that staged a historic strike in the early 1910s. One of the main limitations of the cork industry was a logistical one: the lack of an operational port, which was limited to a small 17th century dock and warehouse that could hardly serve the needs of the existing fishing and cork industries. Understandably, the local elite made the construction of a new port one of their main demands on the central government. The cork industry rapidly declined in the 1950s, triggering a wave of emigration that reduced the population by almost 50% in a single decade. People fled poverty and military conscription in the bloody colonial war against African liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. When dictator Marcelo Caetano announced on television in June 1971 the “Great Sines Project,” which included a new deepwater port, the news was greeted with unexpected enthusiasm, as if the long-awaited infrastructure would soon be realized. However, things turned out to be much worse and unexpected, both for Sines and for Caetano himself.

5. Conclusions

In a pioneering work on the anthropology of planning, Abram and Weszkalnys (2013) observed that “the future promised in plans seems always slightly out of reach, the ideal outcome always slightly elusive, and the plan retrospectively flawed.” The cases of the development poles of Brindisi and Sines offer interesting variations in terms of the temporality of failure, which is obviously not linear. In Brindisi, as in the rest of the South, industrialization was invested in with the messianic mission of modernizing Southern society — freeing it from its own backwardness and immobility - so went the development narrative. Two decades later, in the late 1970s, in a rapidly changing world of crisis and global

reorganization of entire geographies of production and accumulation, the development poles are dismissed as a failure of public intervention. The Sines project, on the other hand, which began construction in the troubled post-revolutionary decade, was dismissed by international economists as a “white elephant.” Four decades later, the Sines Industrial and Logistic Zone is attracting renewed interest for the growing volume of investments it is catalyzing. These different trajectories may partly explain the different densities of socio-environmental conflicts, which I will elaborate on during the seminar.

Were and are the oil and coal industries harmful to the workers and to the populations living near them? In 1989 Brindisi was declared an area of “high environmental risk” by the public authorities and in 1998 it was included in the first national list of the most polluted sites (SIN, Sites of National Interest, which were declared to be in urgent need of rehabilitation and decontamination). In the 1990s, a committee of victims of the petrochemical complex demanded an investigation into the deaths of workers exposed to vinyl chloride monomer (VCM). The hoped-for trial never took place, as the prosecutor ruled that there was no evidence of a causal link between exposure and cancer. Nevertheless, popular epidemiologies proliferated, feeding a new wave of militant activism in the 21st century, targeting the presence of the oil and coal industries.

Nothing of the kind ever happened in Sines, where the few studies that were carried out had no relevant echo in the public debate on the environmental consequences of industrial pollution, which remained uncertain. In 1982, the whole town went on strike against the pollution of the sea - it was called the "Green Strike" - when the oil industry began to operate without a functioning water treatment plant, with the result that the effluent was dumped directly into the sea. Obviously, the industrial complex was not the target of the strike. As one fisherman told one of the many journalists covering the event: “We just wanted the factory to stop polluting the sea.” The same day, a magazine published by the main petrochemical company warned that “the benefits of progress come at a price.” The resulting trade-off — accepting pollution as a necessary evil in exchange for well-paid jobs — made environmental issues an unspoken problem within a framework of unbalanced or negative reciprocity. It was there, but its discussion was limited to negotiations between local authorities and company representatives; in short,

environmental problems became a matter of measurements and parameters to be agreed upon and controlled.

During the seminar, I will present some events that allow me to trace the relevance of such trade-offs and frameworks as integral features of popular ecologies. Some events refer to important accidents (tragic explosions) that revealed the extent of local populations' exposure to industrial hazards. However, as I will show, although the accidents occurred more or less in the same years, their temporality (in terms of their social perception) was different in the two cities; in Brindisi (1977) it marked the end of the positive industrial expansion, followed by severe restructuring and the collapse of expectations of employment opportunities; in Sines (1980), on the contrary, the accident marked the uncertain beginnings of the industrial complex, as it occurred shortly after the oil refinery started operating and while many other infrastructures (including the power plant) were still (or not yet) under construction. Ironically, Brindisi experienced only one major accident in 1977, while Sines experienced several major accidents at the oil terminal from 1980 onwards. The two accidents represent two important counterpoints to the rites of foundation and refoundation (in post-revolutionary Portugal) of the industrial cities, as they took place in the optimistic context of the post-war economic miracle and capitalist expansion in Italy, and in the context of the post-revolutionary formation of new democratic institutions.

The two accidents allow me to present the ways in which conflict and consent around environmental issues have developed in both regions, pointing to the different ways in which people have learned to live with industrial hazards and pollution, and to the role of "corporate social technologies" (Rogers 2013) in shaping the social legitimacy of industrial infrastructures. I will look at moments of open conflict, which I frame as "breaking points" that provide moments of transparency of the tensions, expectations, and negotiations that constitute popular ecologies as specific configurations of social, economic, political, and environmental relations.

References

- Abram, Simone, and Gisa Weszkalnys (eds) 2013. *Elusive promises: planning in the contemporary world*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013.
- Barca S (2012b) On working-class environmentalism: A historical and transnational overview. *Interface* 4(2):61–80.
- Boyer, Dominic 2017: Revolutionary infrastructure. In: Penny Harvey, Casper Bruun Jensen and Atsuro Morita (eds) *Infrastructures and Social Complexity: A Companion*. London and New York: Routledge, 174–186.
- Brown, P. (1987). Popular Epidemiology: Community Response to Toxic Waste-Induced Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts. *Human Values* 12(3-4): 78-85
- Burke, Peter (2009 [1978]). Introduction to the Third Edition. In *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Chatterjee, Partha (2019). *I Am the People: Reflections on Popular Sovereignty Today*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Collectif Rosa Bonheur (2019). *La vulle vue d'en bas. Travail et production de l'espace Populaire*. Paris: Éditions Amsterdam.
- Dürr E, Müller J (eds) 2019. *The Popular Economy in Urban Latin America: Informality, Materiality, and Gender in Commerce*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
- Crehan K (2016) *Gramsci's Common Sense: Inequality and its Narratives*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Filipo, Fabrice (ed.) 2021. Vers de nouvelles écologies populaires? *Écologie & Politique* n° 62.
- Forgacs D. (2008). Gramsci's notion of the "popular" in Italy and Britain: A tale of two cultures. In Manfred Pfister, Ralf Hertel (eds). *Performing National Identity: Anglo-Italian Cultural Transactions*. Amsterdam-New York: Editions Rodopi, pp. 179-195.
- Gago V 2017. *Neoliberalism from Below: Popular Pragmatics and Baroque Economies*. Durham & London: Duke University Press.
- Gago V 2018. What are popular economies? *Radical Philosophy* 2(2):31-38
- Guha R, Martinez-Alier J 2010. *Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South*. London: Earthscan
- Gramsci A (1975) *Quaderni del carcere*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Hall S 1981. Notes on deconstructing 'the popular'. In R Samuel ed. *People's History and Socialist Theory*. London: Routledge: 227-240.
- Hall, S (1988). *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left*. London: Verso.
- Katz C 2001. Vagabond capitalism and the necessity of social reproduction. *Antipode* 33(4):709–728.

- Martinez-Alier J (2002) *The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Massey, D., (1994), A global sense of place, in *Space, Place, and Gender*, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 146–156.
- Narotzky S (ed) 2020. *Grassroots Economies: Living with Austerity in Southern Europe*. London: Pluto Press.
- Pusceddu, A. M. (2022) «Ed io non volevo lasciare l'impronta del fuggiasco». Memoria e scrittura di un militante sindacale nel petrolchimico di Brindisi, *Il de Martino. Storie Voci Suoni*, n. 34, pp. 133-163. https://www.aisoitalia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/De-Martino-34_2022.pdf
- Rogers, D. (2012). The Materiality of the Corporation: Oil, Gas, and Corporate Social Technologies in the Remaking of a Russian Region. *American Ethnologist* 39(2): 284–296.
- Thompson, E. P. 1993. The Moral Economy Reviewed. In *Customs in Common*, 259–351. London: Penguin.
- Williams, R. (1983). Popular. In *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.